McFall, Lynne. Happiness. Studies in Moral Philosophy, vol 1
New York: Peter Lang, 1989. Pp. 129
There are at least three conceptions of happiness, argues Lynne McFall. The most important of these, however, is evaluative happiness, which McFall analyzes as the disposition to derive satisfaction through affirming justifiably the goodness of one’s life as a whole. This conception she ties to a normative definition of personhood. To be a person, she argues, is to be motivated by ideals one believes justifiable.
Are there specific ideals necessary for a happy life? McFall maintains that rationality at the very least, probably justice as well, are necessary for an evaluatively happy life. She locates her arguments about rationality within the context of the debate over whether values are subjective or objective. McFall works out a position which she believes combines the strengths, but avoids the weaknesses, of the extremes.
McFall tests her analysis of evaluative happiness against how we judge the lives of such characters as the contented idiot, the incompetent bottlecap collector, the deluded fool, the impossible idealist, and the successful immoralist.
This book is full of interesting ideas boldly and cogently presented. It is an excellent inaugural volume to a new series on moral philosophy edited by John Kekes.